Handling the ‘NO DEMAND FOR REFORM’ claim

Quoting the AV-Referendum of 2011 is the easiest way for front-line media interviewers to block discussion of electoral reform.

This is a serious impediment to getting positive messages over to the public about PR. Electoral reform is discussed very rarely in mainstream media so any opportunities are precious. You will find a short video on our Facebook page called: Handling the false claim there is no demand for UK electoral reform.

The exchange is usually introduced by the reformer who makes a point about the FPTP system being unrepresentative and unfair. The interviewer typically responds quoting AV2011 and affirming it was rejected by the British people. The reformer nearly always tries to protest the truth, that it was never a true referendum for PR. The presenters know this very well but still cut things short by arguing it would have been a staging post in the right direction for something better…

In other words, the reformer is very easily made to seem on the defensive. A change of tactic is necessary and it can do no harm here to try and turn the tables by going on the attack.

So instead of going down the AV is not PR line, we should say that AV2011 was a mistake. It should never have happened. It was the Lib-Dem leadership’s fault that it went ahead at all.

It was a strategic blunder of huge proportions. There was no co-ordinated campaign and there was no widespread consultation or unity among potential partners. There was no coherent message, no flag flying* to get behind and the whole episode has been described as bad-tempered and ill-informed. It was held on the same day as local elections, renowned for low turn-outs, in many areas of England and sure enough the turnout was 42%.

A spade should be called a spade: the blame lies squarely with the Liberal-Democrat leadership. They wanted to chalk up something concrete to show for their Coalition status. On a hope and a prayer what they did was divert potentially more constructive pressure for electoral reform onto the sidelines, while providing enough ammunition to the status quo to last a generation.

There are several strands of evidence backing up the strategic naivety of the Lib-Dem leadership. Bear in mind that two of their party’s highest profile, flagship policies were electoral reform and Europe.

  • From the moment they decided to enter Coalition with the Tories, they made a number of bad judgements, the one mostly remembered being on tuition fees.

  • They demanded nothing on the EU – for example, a Minister for the EU or increased dissemination of positive aspects of EU membership.

  • Even if they thought they had a chance of winning it, they agreed to far too early a date for AV2011 which left no time for the necessary preparation and organisation referred to above.

  • The coalition was an opportunity to showcase a ‘PR-style alternative’ and demonstrate government need not resemble the fears FPTP advocates had always stoked up. The Lib-Dem leadership failed comprehensively – almost as if they did not grasp that the opportunity was a real one.

We should not attach blame to Liberal-Democrat voters. They made their feelings known in 2015 when support fell from an impressive 6.8m in 2010 all the way down to 2.4m.

The Liberal-Democrat legacy then is, if anything, a more tarnished image for PR and, more concretely, one year after the Coalition, a vote to exit from the EU.

Yet Mr Clegg when interviewed still convinces himself and tries to convince us that they did a great job of holding down the Tories. Denial is not helpful when looking for a way to topple the overbearing edifice that is AV2011. Parties to a future campaign for electoral reform must confess and agree that it was a big strategic blunder. The party to blame must take it on the chin and move on. It will be better for them and all the more condusive to the more assertive, positive and modern case for electoral reform this website promotes.

*It’s worth noting that the Remain campaign were much criticised for printing and distributing to every household a  leaflet containing its arguments for staying in the EU. Despite the fact that each full facing page in the document was a glossy, colour photograph, not a single image of the EU flag was visible (nor at any other time in the campaign as far as we recall). A grave strategic error?

Careful planning for electoral reform

This site hopes that everyone has learnt the  lesson of 2011. When the Lib-Dems, led at the time by Nick Clegg, agreed to a no-hope AV referendum, the movement for electoral reform was in effect throwing an ill-considered, wild swing. It was a clumsy haymaker the other side could see coming and duck with absolute ease. What’s more, AV isn’t even a proper proportional voting system. There’s no kinder way of putting this – it was a pathetic, misguided episode.

Surely the movement is not going to go there again.

In order to take a serious approach to achieving electoral reform, we’re setting out here what we think are four absolutely indispensable planning stages:

  1. co-ordinating across all activist partners to ensure qualified representatives finally decide on the optimum PR system for UK general elections, in a way that carries the widespread, evidenced confidence of supporters of reform.

  2. via forums and other means of input, setting the standard for PR and promoting wide understanding of the key features a new electoral process will have to embody to ensure delivery of the fair and transparent system voters are entitled to.

  3. developing a set of evidence-based, modern, relevant arguments to spearhead and explain: (a) the case for reform in general and (b) the rationale for the chosen PR system (let’s face it, the old arguments haven’t gained a working foothold).

  4. anticipating the counterarguments and blocking/diversionary tactics those valiant defenders of the status quo will use when they aim to sweep reform into the sidelines: take this seriously – they aim to be ruthlessly effective at blocking the way.

Sometimes it doesn’t harm to state the obvious: imagine how easily doubt and confusion will be sewn in an electoral reform movement that lacks clarity, unity & co-ordination.

So these are the broader strategies for success encapsulated in these four planning stages. We say they need to be in place at the outset, in advance of more detailed planning. Do you agree? Are there other equally essential broad strategies we haven’t included?

5.5.5 & Counting believes the path to electoral reform will be a difficult one and it is not possible, however nice it would be, to get there in a single, over-optimistic step.